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Abstract: 
In the wake of 2008 financial crisis there has been growing interest in issues related to 
macroprudential policy and the coordinated attempt to ensure financial stability as a 
whole. The main objective of the paper is to provide a combination of both theoretical 
and empirical analysis of the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, implemented in 
Brazilian economy in 2010. Based on an existing methodology and using data from 
46 countries, the paper develops methods for assessing the sensitivity of capital flows 
to global financial conditions. The main empirical findings cannot be interpreted in 
terms of effectiveness of the measures, since the interaction terms aiming to capture 
potential shift in Brazilian capital inflows turn out to be statistically insignificant both 
prior and after the introduction of the measures. 
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I. Introduction. 
"Going forward, a critical question for regulators and supervisors is what 
their appropriate field of vision should be. Under our current system of safety-
and-soundness regulation, supervisors often focus on the financial conditions 
of individual institutions in isolation. An alternative approach, which has been 
called system-wide or macroprudential oversight, would broaden the mandate 
of regulators and supervisors to encompass consideration of potential systemic 
risks and weaknesses as well..." 
         Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke (2008) 
     The recent financial crisis of 2008-2012 provoked soaring social cost who has so 
far incurred not only in terms of bail outs, but mostly related to forgone decrease in 
economic output. The impact on the real economy has shattered the public’s 
confidence on the financial sector, its intermediaries and mostly its regulation. Since 
banks, financial institutions and the complementary “Shadow Banking System”1 
played a major role in triggering off the sub-prime crisis, a new consensus appeared in 
both policy makers and academia focusing on an enhanced regulation of the financial 
system as a whole. Most of the worlds’ advanced countries and even more emerging 
countries have implemented various instruments in order to handle the necessary 
financial stability in parallel with the other objectives related to macroeconomic 
stability. 
     Central role for the swelling of the causes that led to the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and continually to the distress that followed, played the global conditions 
prior to 2007, a period broadly called “the great moderation”. In advanced countries 
the general financial deregulation especially in USA (see, Sherman. 2009 for a 
detailed analysis), was carried out with greater confidence in the capacity to dispel 
risk and intense utilization of sophisticate derivative products (such as, the famed 
CDS and CDO). Relied with full confidence on US response to handle efficiently 
other intricate situations such as the “9/11” or the “Internet bubble”, the global 
financial system continued to feasibly generate excessive–risk taking behavior by 
both lenders and borrowers. United States managed to achieve the specific efficiency 
by implementing loose monetary policy to produce quick recoveries, an approach 
which had been heavily criticized both prior and after the blast of the crisis (see for 
example, Taylor 2008 and Adrian and Shin 2008). Moreover, and mainly in Europe, 
private and public debt hiked, frequently beyond existing institutional fiscal pacts 
such as the Maastricht treaty, a fact that formulated a vulnerable environment when 
the danger appeared. 
     Currently, a great argument related to the interaction between credit dynamics and 
the well-known asset price bubble (and its role as a major rationale for the burst) had 
induced one more time economists to provide diverse responses. Typically, allowing 
the function of growing asset prices is likely to magnify positive wealth effects (on 
                                                          
1
 According to the Financial Stability Board (FSB), global regulations for the shadow banking system 
will come into effect by 2015. 
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the topic of - consumer prices or purchasing power), however, and supposing that the 
constant climb in assets prices is not justified by fundamentals, regulators seem to 
have neglected the bubble danger that lurked aside. The function of the financial 
system gave the impression that under the regulation of a set of established micro-
prudential instruments designed to control the role of financial intermediaries would 
continue its upward tendency eternally. In the long run, those measures proved 
insufficient to handle the magnitude of the situation. Once again in the economic 
history, the cost of rescuing the improperly regulated financial system was beyond 
any imagination inducing authorities to act without any further delay
2
.   
     In that context, beyond the imprudent financial market behavior, procyclicality
3
, 
corrosion of lending standards, and mainly exacerbated leverage and credit led to 
unsound consumption, financed by debt. These channels triggered an international 
debate regarding “global imbalances” which divided the analytical thinking into two 
sides. In one part of the spectrum, plenty of international economists argued that 
“current account deficits and surpluses were a win-win situation for both developing 
and developed countries” (Silva and Harris, 2012) while the conflicting view claimed 
that the specific situation was an unstable equilibrium, promoting financial distress to 
spread globally and finally facing the second most severe economic crisis following 
the Great Depression - (see for example, Roubini and Setser (2005) and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2009). 
     Considering the macroeconomic and financial vulnerability of advanced, emerging 
and developing countries the crisis caught them in relatively dissimilar situations. 
According to recent studies due to the deep and integrated financial markets, the 
advanced countries seemed to be the great losers in terms of output decline compared 
with the rest of the world (Campello et. al., 2009 and Russo and Katzel, 2011). 
Mainly the countries in the European periphery appear to be widely affected 
accompanied with significant depressing outcome in the whole Europe and United 
States. Additionally, developing countries have been widely affected as well, 
attributable to the direct interconnectedness with the leading countries through various 
channels such as dependence on foreign direct investments, trade, and remittances. 
Whereas, various emerging countries, including Brazil, managed to overcome the 
turmoil due to the relative sound fundamentals, confirming the attempts of those 
countries to go forward into the pursuit of advanced economies. 
     In the case of Brazil specifically, since the mid-1990s -preceding the crisis- the 
local authorities had adopted regular macroeconomic policies to manage inflation 
fluctuations and fasten expectations, including an inflation targeting structure. 
Furthermore, Brazil jointly with plenty of emerging economies chose a flexible 
exchange rate regime as an initial cushion against capital flows (mainly inflows) and 
                                                          
2
 A study by Hahm et al. (2012) provides an extensive analysis on the costly rescuing after the 
outburst of the financial crisis. 
3
 Procyclicality is the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a trend during the economic 
cycle. Thus, increased procyclicality means fluctuations with broader amplitude. Taken from, Jean-
Pierre Landau, Spain's conference on Procyclicality and the Role of Financial Regulation (2009). 
7 
 
the forgone instability that those flows can give rise to. Eventually and perhaps most 
notably, Brazilian authorities did not follow the uncertain recipe that most of the 
sophisticated economies held related to actions of financial deregulation of the former 
to the crisis period. In contrast, they insisted on maintaining a cautious and prudential 
regulatory outline on the financial sector, accompanied by well-capitalized institutions 
and closely-persistent supervision, (Silva et. al. 2012). 
     After the blast of the global 2007 crisis, numeral academics and mainly 
policymakers started calling on central banks to adopt systematically and directly a 
financial stability aim into their reaction function. Given that under the earlier lax 
regulation in combination with the broader view that the already mentioned traditional 
micro-prudential tools proved to be inadequate to dampen financial risk, the global 
community had to act and “generate” a new policy toolkit able to lessen financial risk 
as soon as possible. That “new” objective was destined to consider the interaction 
between achieving the macroeconomic goals in parallel with a broad financial 
stability. With the initial vision on the side of systemic risk, abundance of proposals 
based on prudential framework extended the existing toolkit towards a 
macroeconomic aspect which meant to be the initiative behind “macroprudential” 
regulation. 
We need a new set of macro-prudential policy tools which will enable the 
authorities more directly to influence the supply of credit [ . . . ]. These tools 
are needed because credit/asset price cycles can be key drivers of 
macroeconomic volatility and potential financial instability [. . .]. 
     (Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority, Turner, 2010a). 
     The widely growing literature on macroprudential policy to date, has tried to 
define and set its objectives but there are various approaches resembling a pure 
definition. Broadly speaking, macroprudential (Map) policy aims to strength financial 
stability but once again there is no common definition of financial stability
4
. Certainly 
though, most Central Banks made clear that Map measures are not a substitute for 
monetary policy and is more likely treated as the toolkit to fill the existing gap related 
to financial regulation. The major fundamental idea, was to expand the existing 
micro-prudential tools alerting the focus from individual supervision of financial 
institutions and banks in a more comprehensive toolkit restricting the uncontrolled 
operation of the financial system as a whole. A latest study by Galati and Moessner 
(2013) provides an explicit literature review related to macroprudential policy, based 
on particular tools - their usage, implementation, effectiveness and interplay with 
monetary policy. Next, a study by the Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS 2010) of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), provides the available 
set of instruments and frameworks abbreviating experiences denoted by Central 
                                                          
4
 A working definition of financial stability according to Silva et al. (2012): A financial system is 
“stable” when it continues performing its functions across a time dimension without building-up 
systemic risk measured across its cross section dimension.  
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Banks worldwide. The same paper provides a range of existing tools illustrated in 
Table 1 below, which categorizes a variety of instruments as specified by the 
vulnerability they address and the financial system’s section they intent to restrict.   
Table 1: Macroprudential measures by system component and vulnerability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CGFS Working paper No 38 (2010) 
     Approaching at a slow pace the main subject of this paper, since the topic of Map 
policy has recently been put under thoroughly analysis
5
, plethora of empirical studies 
were conducted by researchers from all over the world, with precursors papers by the 
IMF (see, Lim et al. 2011 and Nier et al.2012) and the BIS (see, BIS working papers 
number 21, 38 and 128), depicting instructions from country occurrences in 
implementation of Map instruments. Most of the studies just mentioned found that 
when an instrument or a combination of instruments was implemented according to 
the required situation, it managed to reduce systemic risk quite effectively, either in 
its time or cross sectional dimension
6
.  In that spirit, an influential paper by Bruno and 
Shin (2013) confirms the previous findings by IMF and BIS. The particular study 
draws conclusions on the effectiveness of Map regulation implemented by Korean 
authorities in 2010. The analysis that follows is based on this particular paper, 
developing the same methodology as the authors applied but considering different a 
geographical area, that of Brazil, and expanding the time period until the end of 2013. 
    Since 2010, the central Bank of Brazil has introduced a series of macroprudential 
measures aimed to monitor system risk while the country has been exposed to 
international economic uncertainty and capital flow volatility. The main policy issue 
troubling the authorities since the global financial crisis is to restrict and control the 
                                                          
5
 As an early use of the term, BIS records suggest that its first appearance in an international context 
dates back to 1979.(Clement 2010)  
6
 The time dimension of systemic risk deals with the evolution of aggregate risk in the financial system 
over time while the cross section dimension is related to the distribution of risk across the financial 
system at a given point in time, and has to be understood looking at the interconnectedness and 
resilience of the market structure.(Silva and Harris 2012), (Borio 2009). 
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large capital inflows. The review of the performance of Brazil’s macroprudential 
instruments that the paper explores is based on a panel study, where Brazil is the 
country of interest among a sample of 46 countries. In line with Bruno and Shin 
(2013), the approach is aimed to treat the countries other than Brazil as a comparison 
group and derive conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the policy applied.  
     Regarding the main findings of the empirical study, the interaction terms which 
have been designed to capture potential shift in Brazilian capital inflows turn out to be 
statistically insignificant. Consequently, the explanatory variables that succeeded to 
explain the decrease in Koreas’ capital inflows after the introduction of the measures 
are not associated with banking capital flows of Brazil. Furthermore, vulnerability to 
global banking factors is statistical insignificant both prior and after the introduction 
of the measures. Potential reasons, explaining the specific outcome could be the 
combination of (i) small share of foreign banks presence, (ii) relatively low 
dependence on external funds and (iii) limited foreign exposures. Besides, the 
composition of capital flows between the two countries seemed to have affected the 
output of the empirical investigation. Apart from the empirical analysis related to 
capital flows, my study investigates under a theoretical perspective the broad 
effectiveness of macroprudential policy, implemented in various frictions of the 
domestic economy, concluding that, Brazilian authorities managed to overcome the 
severe turmoil of the global financial crisis in a quite sufficient way. 
    Based on empirical evidence, the paper attends to fill the gap related to the 
implementation of macroprudential policy on Brazil associated to capital flows. The 
specific question my study seeks to answer is the following: Compared to the rest of 
countries in the sample, the paper seeks to identify whether the Brazilian vulnerability 
to global banking factors, associated with capital flows, was enhanced since the 
period of implementation (2010), or not. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 provides detailed analysis regarding the broad concept of macroprudential 
policy. Section 3, presents a thorough examination of the global banking system 
linked to the crisis and its impact on Brazilian economy. Next, section 4, narrows 
down the case of Brazil and section 5 describes the implementation of Map policy. 
Section 6 describes the data and model specification while the main empirical 
investigation is presented in Section 7. Finally, section 8 discusses further potential 
reasons behind the insignificant outcome of the empirical part and the last section 
concludes. 
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II. Macroprudential Policy. 
A. Definition: 
     The explosive nature of the global financial environment made Map a useful 
policy response for numerous countries threatened by the exogenous shock. The 
reaction though varied to a large extent among policymakers worldwide. As an 
immediate consequence, the demand for a concrete definition was compulsory, not 
only related to the term but mainly of its objectives and scope. Regarding the role of 
Map policy, in accordance with a paper conducted under the demand of Bank of 
England (2009), the term has always been associated with the broad concern related to 
the interaction between the overall macroeconomy and the financial system.  
     More precisely, objectives such as provision of payment services and credit 
intermediation are aimed to contribute the avoidance of boom and bust cycle of credit 
and liquidity. In that context, authorities seem to be determined to raise regulatory 
standards via a significant increase on the cost of financial intermediation. Thus, the 
primary role of Map policy would be to pacify the fury of credit cycle. Taking 
everything under consideration, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 
cooperation with the BIS and the Financial Stability Board, defined Map based on 
three different elements which are: Its’ objective, its analytical scope, its instruments 
and associated governance
7
: 
 Objective: To limit the risk of widespread disruptions to the provision of 
financial services and thereby minimize the impact of such disruptions on the 
economy as a whole. Systemic risk is largely driven by fluctuations in 
economic and financial cycles over time, and the degree of interconnectedness 
of financial institutions and markets. 
 Analytical Scope: The focus is on the financial system as a whole (including 
the interactions between the financial and real sectors) as opposed to 
individual components. 
 Instruments and associated governance: It primarily uses prudential tools that 
have been designed and calibrated to target systemic risk. Any non-prudential 
tools that are part of the framework need to be specifically designed to target 
systemic risk through their governance arrangements. 
     At that point, derived from papers on relevant literature, an important distinction 
should be made between micro-prudential and macro-prudential frameworks (See 
Table 2A, in Appendix-Micro in opposition to Macro prudential measures). As a 
starting point, based on a paper by Hanson et al. (2011), “a microprudential approach 
is one in which regulation aims to prevent the costly failure of individual financial 
institutions. By contrast, a macroprudential approach recognizes the importance of 
general equilibrium effects, and seeks to safeguard the entire financial system”. In 
that point, attention should be directed on the conventional banking guideline which is 
                                                          
7
 Source: Lim et al. 2011, Macroprudential Policy: What Instruments and How to use them? 
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based on the subsequent logic: Government-insured deposits could be and frequently 
are, the source of banks financing, which in turn generates a motivation for bank 
directors to take imprudent risks, since losses will be covered by the taxpayers.  
     Undoubtedly, the mechanism just described, has been efficiently restricted by 
microprudential policy, which induces banks to internalize losses. Thus, under the 
specific regulation, the potential losses of deposit insurer are lessened to the most 
achievable way. The question that normally arises is: why this policy proved to be 
inefficient to cope with the magnitude of the recent financial crisis? The key factor 
and the major critique conceals behind the adequate capital ratio that each bank 
should maintain. Provided that, the instrument of capital ratio is defined as the total 
amount of capital over the total amount of assets, the authorities are not concerned 
how the required adjustment will be obtained
8
. During crisis periods, the continuously 
reduction of assets, known as fire-sale, that bulk of troubled institutions performed, 
ended up with the blast that occurred since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2007.  
     Having understood the reasoning behind the inadequate microprudential regulation 
it is totally understandable why the swift to a more macroprudential approach was 
obligatory. As in most cases related to economic crisis, prior warnings made their 
appearance not only relatively close to the crisis (Borio, 2003
9
), but a couple of 
decades ago. In particular, Chiriacescu (2013) explains thoroughly the “Misky’s 
financial instability hypothesis” which dates back in 1974. Surprisingly, the specific 
theory emerged only in the wake of the recent financial crisis. In a nutshell, the theory 
states that due to increased asset prices the subsequent financial growth is linked with 
periods of prolonged prosperity, which end up to an undeniably fragile and vulnerable 
financial interaction. Paradoxically, Misky’s proposal on amplification of supervisory 
and regulation complies entirely with the current state of global economy. 
     In that context, a vast number of studies have been published, exploring mainly 
under a theoretical perspective, the relationship involving the interplay of 
macroprudential with monetary policy (Beau et. al 2011). For instance, Angelini et al. 
(2011), Kannan et al. (2009) and Agenor and Silva (2011) develop a dynamic general 
equilibrium model, to assess the interaction between a countercyclical 
macroprudential and monetary policy. Regarding the empirical part, a paper by Nier 
et al. (2012) which presents evidence from Central Eastern- South Eastern Europe, 
Brazil, Turkey, Korea and United States- sheds light on the relationship of those two 
policies. Since the specific topic (interaction of monetary with Map policy), is not the 
main focus of this paper, I will note expand my analysis further except from a general 
conclusion. Broadly speaking, both theoretical and empirical evidence propose that 
                                                          
8
A troubled bank, is supposed to restore the sufficient capital ratio.The regulator does not care 
whether the bank adjusts via the numerator or via the denominator-that is, by raising new capital or 
by shrinking assets. In most cases, banks that act under the interest of their shareholders will tend to 
fix their damaged capital ratio by shrinking assets rather than by raising new capital, even when the 
latter is more desirable from a social perspective. Hanson et al.(2011) 
9
 In his study conducted in 2003, Borio illustrated the necessity to strength banking supervision and 
regulation under the unfamiliar in those days, macroprudential approach. 
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Map tools, which are analyzed in the next subsection, could be functional complement 
to monetary policy in alleviating the economy after the primary distress. 
 B. Macroprudential Instruments: 
     Regarding the various instruments applied, country experience indicate that it is 
not feasible to combine them together into one big category, but rather to include 
them into one wide-ranging toolkit which is separated into three main types of 
measures: Credit, liquidity and capital related.  Table 2 presents a selection of 
measures and the respectively explanation of their use. In general, according to 
different situations that each country may face, there is a great number of instruments 
that can be applied depending on which of them are politically and economically 
more convenient. For example, the employment of different instruments might vary, 
depending on county’s credit cycle or the potential diversity in the composition or 
size of the banking sector. 
Table 2: Macroprudential instruments, credit-liquidity and capital related. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lim et al.(2011). 
The elaborate investigation of each instrument is beyond the purposes of this paper 
since a large number of existing studies provide an advanced analysis on the subject 
of theoretical background, usage and implementation. For a thoroughly report of the 
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above, the interested reader is encouraged to look through the original papers of 
CGFS Working paper n.38 (2010), Lim et al. (2011), Hanson et al. (2011), Shin 
(2011) and a discussion paper by Bank of England (2011).  
     Next, there are several motives behind the use of each instrument and the rationale 
that indicates its preference. Compared to monetary and fiscal policies, Map tools are 
more flexible, with lower lags on implementation. For instance, these instruments are 
profoundly functional when a tightening of monetary policy is not desired. 
Furthermore, the majority of the tools are able to limit the cost of policy intervention 
since they can be modified to target on risks of specific sectors without causing a 
widespread decrease of economic activity. Additional reasons can be that in most 
cases, the simple and easy implementation of those tools, combined with the lack or 
minimization of potential market distortions is considered as a great advantage. 
Especially for the advanced economies, which are dominated by big nonbank 
financial sectors and complex interconnected financial systems, Map toolkit manages 
to eliminate the latent regulatory arbitrage and foster the financial stability. 
     Regarding the choice of instruments, a number of aspects dominate. More 
precisely Figure (1) illustrates that mainly the selection relies on the magnitude of the 
financial sector, the regime of exchange rate, and finally whether the examination 
refers to advanced or emerging countries.  
Figure 1: Implementation of Macroprudential Measures. 
 
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Percentage of countries in each group using each type of instrument.  
Sources: IMF Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy Survey, 2010 
 
     As Figure 1 depicts, emerging market economies compared to advanced 
economies appear to made a widely use of Map instruments, which according to IMF 
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is mainly due to the significantly smaller and not as much as in leading economies, 
developed financial sectors. Moreover, according to Figure 1, the selection of 
exchange rate regime influences the choice of instruments. Given that fixed or 
managed exchange rate restricts the space for interest rate policy, countries with the 
particular regime tend to implement more Map instruments. For instance, credit-
related in parallel with liquidity- related measures are more likely to be met in these 
countries. Finally and perhaps most importantly during a crisis, the type of shock 
threatening the domestic economy is another factor that may influence the choice of 
instruments. Given the degree of openness, mainly for emerging markets, excessive 
capital inflows can cause a negative impact on the financial sector. Hence, liquidity 
related measures and tools in order to moderate the resultant credit growth are more 
commonly used by those economies. In general, country experience highlights that, 
Map policy usage is straightly directed to restrict the negative consequences of 
inflows, such as, excessive leverage and credit growth, rather than to be treated as 
capital controls that target in reducing the volume of flows. 
C. Effectiveness: 
     The proponents of the use of macroprudential tools (see for example, Lim et. al 
2011 and Claessens and Ghosh 2012) claim that countries which used a combination 
of them, managed successfully to achieve their wide stability goals, such as avoiding 
uncontrolled credit creation or excessive currency mismatches. On the other hand, 
there are no stated opponents of the specific policy without this implying that there 
are no possible implications that might arise. Since those instruments have been 
introduced mainly over the last four years, researches and policymakers are in a 
relatively cautious position to derive instantly conclusions regarding their efficiency. 
Table 3 below summarizes the effectiveness of various macroprudential instruments 
in terms of frequency. 
 
Table 3: Effectiveness on macroprudential measures in terms of frequency. 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Galati and Moessner (2013) 
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     Even so, given the empirical evidence to date, the effectiveness and the general 
impact of Map policy are not so far from being relative understood. In most cases, the 
assessment of effectiveness was examined in combination with other policies, 
whereas, deeper and enhanced observation of Map efficacy in isolation is extremely 
essential, as well. My analysis using evidence from Brazil contributes exactly on that 
later view. Besides, abundance of recent studies tried to evaluate the effectiveness of 
Map tools focusing both on advanced and emerging countries. For instance, Wignall 
and Roulet (2013), Galati and Moessner (2012), Lim et al. (2011) and Claessens and 
Ghosh (2012) are just a few in comparison with the respectively existing literature. 
    Certainly, there is a number of limitations related to the evaluations of the 
measures. Firstly, since most of the macroprudential instruments are targeted at the 
balance sheet of financial institutions, firm level data should be readily available and 
consistent. In addition, the total number of governments that chose to apply 
macroprudential instruments in a systemic way is relatively small, a fact that limits 
the degree of confidence during the statistical analysis. Table 1A in appendix provides 
a complete selection with countries experience and the frequency of their use. Next, 
selection bias is another issue that may influence the outcome since it usually favors 
situations accompanied by countries facing high risk where tools are implemented due 
to the necessity of response. Finally, the majority of empirical studies do not take into 
consideration issues such as market distortions and further costs which are also key 
essentials to account after the Map instruments implementation. 
     As a closing subject related to Map policy and its effectiveness, it would be 
neglectful not to refer to the importance of international consistency addressed to 
country authorities worldwide. As stated by a report conducted under the request of 
G20 governments in 2011, implications may arise due to (i) the closely integrated 
international capital markets, (ii) the likelihood of negative externalities and (iii) 
mostly as a result of regulatory arbitrage. In order to achieve the desired stabilization, 
collaboration on Map policies entails sufficient institutional mechanisms aiming to 
endorse coordinated policy actions. 
      Over the past years, the Financial Stability Board, IMF, G20 and BIS appear to 
coordinate their actions both in international and domestic level. These attempts target 
on the recognition of common vulnerabilities and potential links within financial 
systems, to guarantee that Map construction in individual countries are commonly 
consistent. At international level, countries should act without further delay given that 
the potential negative outcome in the absence of coordination could be destructive for 
the general financial system. An obvious message from the latest crisis is that, the 
interconnectedness that characterizes the global banking system is highly likely to 
spread systemic risk from one country to the rest of the world. The next section seeks 
to highlight the main aspects governing the global banking system. 
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III. Global banking system. 
 
     Given that macroprudential policy seeks to restrain systemic risk, it would be 
functional to identify and examine potential indicators of systemic risk. In line with 
Bruno and Shin (2013), the next section of this paper deals with the underlying 
mechanisms and complexity of global banking activity, which is considered to be a 
“key driver of financial conditions both within and across borders”. Moreover, in this 
particular section beyond from describing the function of global banking system, I 
will deliberately introduce the key variables of interest that are closely related to the 
empirical part that follows in section 5.  
    To begin with, interconnectedness or specifically “banking interaction channels” is 
one of the most essential features of financial systems and one of the major canals of 
systemic risk spreading to a global scale. The vulnerability that characterizes the 
overall economy can be reflected by the fact that potential undersized shocks affecting 
only a small number of banks can rapidly affect the entire global financial system 
through a contagion effect. What the recent financial crisis has made clear is that, the 
network formation of the banking system has to be taken into consideration in the 
sense of eliminating systemic risk. The relevant literature on the nature of 
interconnectedness of financial networks indicates that beyond the expected “small-
sized” shocks, the unpredictable “large-sized” negative events are more likely to 
extend through the international borders. Specifically, regarding the interbank 
exposure in Brazil according to Figure 2, cross-border interconnectedness in terms of 
external sources of founding is highly vulnerable to sudden stops from European 
countries and the United States. 
 
Figure 2: Cross boarder Interconnectedness in Brazil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
     
 
 
Source: Silva et. al. (2012) 
 
     In addition, a closer look on the liabilities side of a random bank balance sheet 
reveals the fast development of bank lending that took place the period prior to 
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2007
10
. The specific growth in interbank lending was accomplished by shifts in the 
composition of bank’s funding, a process which varies from the traditional way of 
lending. Precisely, since banks are intermediaries who need to borrow from different 
sources in order to satisfy the demand for new loans, their major source of founding is 
the “retails deposit of the household sector” or in accordance with a term that is 
widely used: “the core funding”.  
     In opposition, during a period of a credit boom, the admittance to core deposit 
funding is not in the same level with the lending growth, a fact that leads banks to 
alternate their finance of lending using “non-core” liabilities11. When the financial 
system has an open banking sector, a central element of non-core funding is the cross-
border bank financing where banks draw on wholesale funding supplied by the global 
banks. Figure 3, depicts in a straightforward representation, the origin of foreign 
exposure linked with the growth of non-core liabilities. The top graph shows the 
condition of the banking sector before a credit boom, while the bottom graph 
describes the system after the boom. 
     The primary drawback hindering behind the precise method is that, the banking 
sector’s expansion is based on non-core liabilities from foreign creditors, creating 
uncertain exposure during crisis period, when foreign creditors under the general 
turmoil initiate the process of deleveraging. Moreover, a study by Hahm et al. (2013) 
highlights that the proportion of non-core to core funding is a constantly reliable 
measure of a country’s exposure to a credit crisis. Subsequently, a recent paper by 
Bruno and Shin (2014), investigate a number of global factors that are associated with 
banking capital flows. For instance, the leverage activities of global banks become 
apparent in order to explain the supply push dynamics in cross-border capital flows.  
 
Figure 3: Lending growth through non-core liabilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
Source: Shin/Bank of Chile (2010) 
 
     Consequently, related to the liable behavior of the banking sector, the contribution 
of macroprudential policy, aiming to alleviate such global supply push forces, is 
straightforward. The empirical analysis that follows in section VII can be 
schematically illustrated in Figure 4, which outlines the interplay that occurred 
between local and global banks. In particular, the mechanism across the three stages 
                                                          
10
 See Figure 1A in appendix. 
11
 For deeper understanding related to “core” and “non-core” liabilities, see Shin and Shin (2010). 
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functions as follows: “Global banks increase wholesale US dollar funding via 
borrowing in financial centers and then lend to local banks (stage 1). In turn, local 
banks draw on the cross-border funding (stage 2) in order to lend to their local 
borrowers (stage 3)”. 
 
Figure 4: The different stages of cross border banking flows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bruno and Shin (2013) 
     A paper by BIS (2010), portraits the process through branches and subsidiaries of 
foreign banks in the United States make use of money market funds which are 
directed afterwards back on their headquarters, (Process which most “big” European 
banks implemented prior to 2007
12
). Expressed in a different way, linked to the 
expression of  US in the role of global liquidity insurer, the funds transferred by 
branches to headquarters (or interoffice assets) reflect the massive size of gross capital 
outflows that occurred in US following the crisis. Figure 5, represents the net 
interoffice assets of foreign banks in the US, which reflect the net claim of foreign 
bank’s branch on their headquarters.  
Figure 5: Net interoffice assets of foreign banks in US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The specific series is given by the negative of the “net due to foreign-related offices,  
Source: Federal Reserve H8 series. 
                                                          
12
 For a better understanding, Figures 3A and A4 in appendix plot the claims (deposits and loans) of 
relatively “big” and “small” European countries in terms of banking exposure. 
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     As a general rule, net interoffice assets would be negative under regular 
circumstances (prior to 2000s), for the reason that branches of foreign banks operate 
as lending settlements. In contrast, as Figure 5 illustrates, net interoffice assets from 
2001 until 2010, shifted notably positive. Effectively, it is easily observable that the 
net interoffice position of foreign banks in the US mirrors the degree to which global 
banks were associated in providing US dollar funding to the rest of the world. 
Regarding the empirical part of this paper, in accordance with Bruno and Shin (2013) 
and aiming to identify a major supply push force, the growth of the net interoffice 
account position of foreign banks in the United States has been implemented, as a key 
empirical proxy. 
     Next, as Figure 6 depicts, the rationale for the focus on US dollar-denominated 
bank flows yields from the prevailing role played by the US dollar in the global 
banking structure. Figure 6 plots the foreign currency assets and liabilities of banks 
globally according to BIS locational banking statistics. According to Figure 6, the US 
dollar is the supreme currency servicing activities of global banks and in parallel is 
the currency underpinning the growth of gross capital flows. In comparison, the role 
of other currencies worldwide is way smaller, given that the US dollar assets only 
exceeded 10 trillion dollars in 2008 out of 19 trillion dollars in total. Taking 
everything under consideration, net interoffice assets of foreign banks in the US is 
anticipated to indicate the accessibility of US dollar funding for cross-border 
transactions. 
 
Figure 6: Foreign currency assets and liabilities of BIS reporting banks, 
classified according to currency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIS Locational Banking Statistics Table 5A. 
 
     Returning back to Figure 4, stage (2) refers to the cross-border capital flows that 
take place through the banking sector. The equivalent variable describing the 
connection presented in stage 2 is the claims of the banks in countries that report loan 
amounts to the BIS. An illustrative presentation of the importance of the specific 
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variable is easily seen in Figure 7 which includes the cross-border claims of BIS-
reporting banks for a selection of countries. What is apparent from Figure 7 is the 
harmonized increase in cross-borders lending before 2008, regardless of the wide 
geographical spread between those countries. The particular capital flows mirror the 
interplay of the supply and demand for wholesale funding between international and 
local banks. More accurately, “the liabilities of local banks serve as the assets of 
global banks, and the lending by global banks is the supply of wholesale funding, 
while the borrowing of local banks is its demand”, (Bruno and Shin 2013). The 
overall economy could be affected by global supply push factors that play a major 
role in indicating the direction of capital flows. Under such circumstances, the 
implementation of macroprudential policy is likely to dampen the potential negative 
consequences and contribute in a beneficial way to the stabilization of the economy. 
     Based on the above, the general concept governing the present paper is the 
following: Since, global aspects influence all countries at the same level, the 
following analysis utilizes the available panel data by considering the rest countries in 
the sample as a comparison group, to investigate how the vulnerability of capital 
flows into a particular country (Brazil), fluctuates before and after the implementation 
of Map measures. The empirical analysis takes under consideration two sets of global 
factors. Firstly, as already mentioned, an international aspect which replicates the 
activities of global banks is the growth in the net interoffice assets of foreign banks in 
the US (Figure 5). The observable proliferation of cross-border banking transactions 
could be revealed in the fast growth of net interoffice assets. Merely analyzing Figure 
5 and 7, it is straightforward that a correlation exists, involving the buildup in cross 
border lending (Fig.7) with the accumulation in wholesale funding raised by global 
banks (Fig.5). 
 
Figure 7: External claims (loans and deposits) of BIS reporting country banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The series are normalized to 100 in March 2003. 
Source BIS Banking Statistics Table 7A. 
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      Secondly, another global factor that is included in the empirical part is related to 
the well-known VIX index
13
. Relevant literature confirms that variations in the VIX 
index are strictly connected with leverage activities of international banks (see for 
example, Adrian and Shin 2010). A fact that converts banking sector leverage as a key 
feature of cross border claims. During periods of increased leverage activities, extra 
units of bank capital could denote increased levels of cross-border claims. 
Additionally, higher amounts of banking leverage indicates that existing bank capital 
will maintain even greater volumes of lending. Consequently, according to a 
theoretical perspective explicitly analyzed by Bruno and Shin (2013), since VIX index 
is associated with banking leverage, firstly the level of the VIX and secondly the 
change in the VIX are two variables able to determine the direction of capital flows. 
 
IV. The case of Brazil  
 
     A reasonable question that one could ask, would be why the analysis is 
implemented specifically on the Brazilian economy and by which criteria the 
selection was based. Given that the study of Bruno and Shin (2013) was applied on 
the case of South Korea, my first goal was to identify a country which would be 
similar (as plausible that can be) to Korea’s economical environment. Secondly, in 
order for the paper to have a coherent aspire, the preferred country should have 
implemented macroprudential tools in the wake of 2008 global financial crisis, as 
South Korea did. On the whole the following principles have indicated the rationale 
behind my selection: In line with Fritz and Prates (2014), apart from the managed 
float exchange rate regime, plenty of similarities exist between the two countries prior 
to the crisis. Namely, a couple of common characteristics implemented both in Korea 
and Brazil, are the “high degree of financial openness”, “antagonistic reserve 
accumulation strategy” and “inflation target policy”.  
     Moreover, domestic currency appreciation was the major method applied to lessen 
inflationary pressures in both countries. Another common feature is that both 
countries have a well-developed and actively traded equity and public bonds market, 
in addition to the deep foreign currency (FX) derivatives market
14
.  Taking those 
aspects together, it is straightforward to clarify the heavy impact that the crisis had on 
those countries’ currencies and financial markets. Finally and mostly related to the 
empirical analysis that follows in subsequent section, both Korea and Brazil have 
faced large capital inflow episodes since 2009 and have been the “major destinations 
for portfolio inflows during the new boom in capital flows to emerging countries”. 
Fritz and Prates (2014 p.220).  
     Hence, Figure 8 illustrates the close correlation in terms of capital flows since it 
plots vis-à-vis capital inflows towards South Korea (top chart), and the respective 
flows entering the Brazilian economy (bottom chart).  According to those two graphs, 
a common trend related to total capital inflows is observed, even though the 
composition (Portfolio investment-equity/ debt securities / Banking investments) of 
the funds might differ in size. Both economies, experienced massive capital surges 
                                                          
13
 Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) index of implied volatility (VIX) in the Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 stock index option prices in the United States. 
14
 Those two countries have the largest FX derivatives market among the emerging economies 
(Mihaljek and Packer 2010). 
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(hot money
15
) prior to 2008, followed by a significant drop after the Lehman Brothers 
collapse and hiked again during 2010. In total, the combination of all the above 
factors verifies the motives behind the selection of the Brazilian economy employed 
in the present paper. The next section presents the condition of the Brazilian economy 
before and throughout the global financial crisis. 
 
Figure 8: Capital Flows in South Korea and Brazil (in million US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fritz and Prates (2014) 
 
A. The effects of global financial crisis in Brazil: 
 
     In the context of capturing the effects of global financial crisis in Brazilian 
economy, the financial stability Map (Figure 9)
16
 demonstrates the evolution of key 
factors related to systemic risk. The progression of the Map, spans from 2007 until the 
end of 2011 and is based on six systemic factors: leverage, liquidity, 
interconnectedness, external vulnerability, bank soundness and economic conjecture. 
                                                          
15
  Sales and Barroso (2012), analyze in detail the global liquidity that took place in 2009-10 (See, 
Figure2A in Appendix). Especially for emerging economies, policymakers are primarily concerned by 
inflationary pressures, rapid credit expansion, rising assets prices and exchange rate volatility. 
16
 The various dimensions depicted in the figure have been calculated by (Sales et. al. 2012) as proxies 
respectively to the factors mentioned on the main text: Credit to GDP gap/ Loan to deposit ratio/ 
interconnectedness index/ international reserves to short-term external debt ratio/ non-performing 
loans to total gross loans/ real GDP growth rate(YOY).  
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According to Figure 9, the relative weight of singular risks has modified over the 
period, with a significant broad expansion (as the red line depicts) in 2009.  
 
Figure 9: Financial stability Map in Brazil. 
  
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Silva et. al. (2012) 
 
In particular, leverage has been soaring compared to the rest of the dynamics along 
2008/09. Conversely, following the blast of the global financial crisis liquidity risk 
was the factor that threatened the stability of the Brazilian economy (see blue and 
green line). Moreover, risks related to cross-border interconnectedness have been 
rapidly increased until 2010 and eventually dropped to adequate levels only by the 
end of 2011. After a period of steady rising in external vulnerability, Brazilian 
authorities managed to restrain its’ growth in 2009 but it hiked once again the 
subsequent year. That is just one indication of how fragile the domestic financial 
system can be related to global conditions and its huge impact on vulnerable 
economies. Finally, financial threat linked to bank soundness, peaked in 2009 
reflecting the necessity for banking regulations that followed the next years. 
     Eventually, the Brazilian economy managed to overcome the severe turmoil of the 
global financial crisis in a quite sufficient way. Apart from the set of Map measures 
implemented when the conditions required, the main point that should be noted 
regarding the countries’ capability to “sail against the wind”, was Brazil’s sound 
macroeconomic background which dominated over the preceding years. In line with a 
paper by Tabak and Staub (2006), the likelihood of a devastating collapse in the 
Brazilian banking system prior to the crisis seemed to be highly implausible. This is 
mainly attributed on the combination of sound macroeconomic policies
17
 and 
improvements in the regulation of financial markets that took place in the late 1990s. 
Table 3A in Appendix, summarizes the main features that reflect the sound and 
promising Brazilian economy.  
     Before analyzing the response of the Brazilian authorities it would be useful to 
demonstrate a selection of statistical features representing the impact of the crisis into 
                                                          
17
 Driving forces reflecting the Brazilian macroeconomic conditions are: The abandon of a crawling 
peg and the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime, an inflation targeting outline and the 
enforcement of a new payment system. 
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the domestic economy. According to the Central Bank of Brazil, following the 
Lehman Brothers episode, trade flows dropped by 6.9% in comparison with the 
previous year; the overall industrial production shrank by 27% QOQ; capital outflows 
increased by 36% QOQ provoking the exchange rate to depreciate by 32% YOY and 
finally, credit growth fell by 35% YOY. The reaction of Brazilian authorities was 
quick since they immediately took measures even from the early appearance of the 
shock. 
     Initial priority in their actions, was to deal with the imminent liquidity issues both 
in domestic and foreign currencies. Bank reserve requirements were declined, a fact 
that provided money supply into the economy equal to 4% of nations’ GPD. Next, as 
an attempt to stabilize the trembling global condition, the Central Bank injected the 
exchange currency market by 14.5$ billions which is equivalent to 7% of the entire 
international reserves at the end of 2008. Apart from those interventions, local 
authorities employed a combination of monetary and fiscal policies, the examination 
of which goes beyond the purpose of the paper. Eventually, the response of the 
Brazilian economy generated the expected “V-shaped”18 recovery pattern. Thus, 
during the most destructive period of the global financial crisis (end of 2010), the 
Brazilian economy achieved a remarkable comeback. For example, compared to the 
previous year levels, GDP rate expanded by 7.2%; domestic demand grew by 10.3%; 
private consumption increased by 7.2% and investment by 11.1%. 
     At the same time, global conditions and more precisely interventions by the 
Federal Reserve in the form of quantitative easing which aimed to boost the domestic 
economy (US) had generated spillovers to emerging countries (affecting Brazil as 
well). In the long run, the global environment directed its attention to the option of 
emerging markets (increased demand for assets) and simultaneously forced emerging 
markets currencies to appreciate. Figure 10, plots on the left panel the-Foreign Net 
Portfolio Investments and on the right panel-Exchange rates for a group of countries. 
Regardless of policy actions in the specific countries, additional capital flows 
continued to cross their borders, contributing further to currency appreciation 
accompanied with inflation pressures in their economies. In turn, surges in capital 
inflows contributed to a rapid growth of domestic credit as a result of relaxed local 
credit standards and lowered funding cost. Authorities had to deal with the latent risk 
of credit and asset price bubbles, given that those massive inflows amplified foreign 
currency exposure which made banks more vulnerable. 
     Concerning especially the case of Brazil, those challenges were present with 
overheating signs threatening the economy. One major issue for the Central bank was 
to limit the excessive credit expansion. During the previous decade, based on strong 
fundamentals
19
 that characterized the Brazilian economy, credit expansion was 
already a foremost concern for the authorities. The unexpected events (inflows) that 
followed during the global financial crisis could aggravate the existing from the 
previous years’ credit growth. The general fragile environment described above, made 
obligatory the response under the new approach of macroprudential policy 
 
 
                                                          
18
 See Table-3A in Appendix, Industrial Production. 
19
 Baka and Kokenyne  (2011), explain in detail the Brazilian environment in the 2000s.  A combination 
of: (i) liberalizations in key capital movement restrictions, (ii) sound macroeconomic policy, (iii) 
relative high interest rate differentials with advanced economies and, (iv) low exchange rate volatility, 
attracted huge inflows in the domestic market. 
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Figure 10: Foreign net portfolio investments (left graph) and exchange rates 
(right graph), (normalized to 100).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Silva and Harris (2012) 
 
V. The Brazilian response to the crisis: 
 
     At the end of 2010, Brazilian authorities relied on a broad textbook framework to 
cope with the rising risks of macroeconomic and financial disorder. To begin with, 
major concerns for policymakers were mostly related to the control of supply-demand 
imbalances and restriction of inflation variations. Those issues were controlled with 
the adoption of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies (for a detailed analysis see, 
Silva and Harris 2012). Whereas, for issues related to credit growth and capital flows 
management, Map instruments were established aiming to dampen systemic risk. 
Therefore, central banks innervations aimed to moisten speculative behavior and repel 
excessive capital flows of short-term investments into the country. 
     On the board subject of capital flows, in September 2010 the Brazilian Finance 
Minister, Guido Mantega, made clear by his statement that “macroprudential policy 
was introduced to avoid the entrance of short-term capital flows” given that “a global 
currency war was underway”20. In that sense, in 2012 the IMF relatively reversed its 
persistent position concerning capital management, stating that under specific 
conditions capital controls could be an appropriate instrument in emerging markets, 
designed to moderate foreign exposure and systemic risk. Baba and Kokenyne (2011) 
discuss the effectiveness of capital controls in emerging markets (included Brazil) 
prior to the crisis, while a study by Chamon and Garcia (2013) examines the same 
topic but in the aftermath of 2008 crisis. Both papers verify the view that controls are 
sufficient in terms of restraining the growth of credit bubble, however, the authors 
argue that extensive use of capital controls have limited effect on currency 
appreciation pressures. 
 
A. Macroprudential Policy in Brazil: 
 
     According to the Central Bank of Brazil, the most important Map instruments 
placed into practice were the following: (i) increased bank reserve requirements to 
reduce the contagion effect of global liquidity to the domestic credit market. (ii) 
increased capital requirements for targeted fragments of the credit market (mainly for 
                                                          
20
 See an article in Financial Times- September 27
th
 2010:” The Brazil in currency war alert” by 
Wheatley and Garnham. 
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consumer loans) intending to improve the quality of loan origination and finally (iii) 
new reserve requirements on banks short spot foreign exchange positions and 
taxation of the specific inflows to coordinate imbalances on the foreign exchange 
market and to moisten the soaring variation of capital flows.  
 
Table 4: Applied macroprudential measures in Brazil by system component and 
vulnerability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Silva and Harris (2012). 
 
     In accordance with Table 1 that was presented in the introduction section, the 
range and orientation of the above tools can be outlined in Table 4 above. In 
particular, the cells covered with pink color represent the implementation of the 
specific measures on some segments of the credit market, while red cells indicate 
implementation to all financial system components. On the subject of density across 
the different financial system elements, it is clear from Table 4 that special attention 
has been paid on perils related to banking sector’s Balance sheet. In general, the 
comprehensive Brazilian Map toolkit was specifically designed to address issues of 
leverage, liquidity/market risks and interconnectedness. 
     Analytically, authorities implemented reserve requirements with initial aim to 
ensure liquidity supply within the financial sector and to reinforce the exposed overall 
economy. The Central Bank gave permission on “big-sized” banks to utilize parts of 
their required reserves, given that these funds were to be used to provide liquidity on 
smaller and middle-sized banks. Additionally, facing the threat of credit growth, 
reserve requirements were employed for a second time by the end of 2010 as a 
countercyclical buffer. Reserve requirements were increased from 15% to 20% on 
deposit terms aiming to lessen the fast credit expansion. A study by IMF (Garcia-
Escribano et al. 2011), examined specifically the impact of reserve requirements as a 
Map tool in the Latin America region. They found that the implementation of reserve 
requirements restrain systemic risk and contributes to manage the procyclicality of 
private sector bank dynamics. Furthermore, Montoro and Moreno (2011), examine the 
use of reserve requirements as a policy instrument, using again the same countries as 
a sample of their investigation. However, the authors argue that beyond the apparent 
positive effects (such as: stabilizing interbank rates / curb credit growth / and reduce 
capital flows volatility), there are trade-offs between the use of reserve requirements 
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and the growing cost in the financial sector. Therefore, implications may arise in the 
financial system since borrowers have an incentive to look for other sources of 
funding
21
.  
 
Table 5: Consumer and vehicle loans by maturity and loan to value level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Silva and Harris 2012. 
 
     Next, another measure applied to restrict the credit market growth and precisely 
the rapid expansion of new vehicle loan credit, was the implementation of Financial 
Transactions Tax (IOF). In the middle of 2011, Brazilian policymakers found it 
optimal to raise the level of IOF considering individual credit actions. A recent study 
by Martins and Schechtman (2013), examines in detail the economic impact of the 
particular loans pricing measure implemented by the authorities. For instance, IOF 
rate was doubled in size from 0.0041% to 0.0082% per day or in percentage terms the 
IOF tax rate on transactions was raised from 1.5% to 3%. Moreover, related to credit 
market instruments the adoption of stricter policy against consumer loans for a variety 
of purposes was achieved with increased capital requirements. In practice, Table 5 
summarizes the guideline (maturity and loan to value) established by the Central Bank 
to limit the growth of consumer loans. Precisely, for household loans above 24 
months, capital requirements were increased via a significant extension in the 
previous percentage of Risk Weight Factor (RWF)
22
 from 75% to 150%.  
     Beyond the above Map measures which had been targeted unilaterally on the credit 
market of the Brazilian economy, additional Map tools have been applied on the side 
of foreign exchange market. As mentioned before, authorities took actions in order to 
restrain short-term and speculative capital inflows. Those interventions aiming to 
stem short term carry trades in both spot and future markets had a secondary effect, by 
means of putting further pressure for domestic currency appreciation
23
. Explicitly, 
since the IOF tax is applicable to several segments of the economy depending on the 
                                                          
21
  Normally, borrowers will seek for alternative resources from other foreign countries or even from 
the unregulated financial sector. 
22
 Aiming not to interact with vulnerable segments of the Brazilian economy, the Risk Weight Factor 
was not applicable to agricultural credit operations, mortgage loans or credits for acquisitions of 
trucks and similar vehicles. 
23
 Carry trade is commonly performed in the derivative market through the acquisition of long 
positions on a high yield currency (Brazilian Real) and short position on a funding currency (Dollar, 
Euro or Yen). 
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necessity of each situation, authorities applied IOF tax on non-residential portfolio 
investments and on margin deposits on derivatives. The former taxation on financial 
transactions introduced for foreign portfolio investment in fixed income instruments 
was initially increased from 2% to 4% and afterwards from 4% to 6%. In addition, the 
latter tax on arriving remittances designed to dampen the exposure on derivatives 
positions, was set at 6 percent as well. The particular macroprudential instrument is 
closely associated to the well-known Tobin Tax (1978), which was initially proposed 
to influence currencies conversation
24. It is worth mentioning that Tobin’s tax, 
indented to curb the return on “hot money” and therefore lessen exchange rate 
instability, fact that is in a way, one of Map policy objectives. 
      A number of supplementary restrictions were implemented in order to support the 
effectiveness of the above measures. For example, every domestic transport of non-
resident funds was weighted down by an immediate IOF levy. Furthermore, domestic 
banks were prohibited to borrow securities abroad, in order to minimize potential 
ways of avoiding the taxation on derivative margin deposits. Figure 11 below, plots 
portfolio net inflows in Brazilian economy for the period between 2008 and 2012. A 
quick examination of the Figure provides valuable signs on the effectiveness of the 
measures just described. The exact date of IOF tax implementation is depicted by the 
vertical grey line. Thus, comparing the levels of portfolio inflows before and after the 
implementation of the specific measure, the efficiency of the tax is straightforward. 
 
Figure 11: Net inflows by assets class. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Silva and Harris 2012 
 
     A second measure implemented in foreign exchange market was bank reserve 
requirements on short positions in the FX spot market. In January 2011, the local 
authorities established a 60% steady reserve requirement on banks short position in 
the foreign exchange spot market that exceed 3 billion US$. Besides, in June of the 
same year, government shrank the requirement to FX positions larger than one billion 
US$. Considering the impact of those two measures, financial behavior adjusted with 
a daily demand to sell domestic currency equal to 447 and 621 billion US$ 
respectively
25
. The logic governing the specific Map measure was the limitation of the 
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  Even though Tobin tax might repulse foreign investments that could have a positive impact on real 
economy, numerous of economists worldwide argue that the potential revenue from the taxation 
could be utilized in cases of emergency like the recent global financial crisis.  
25
 The former case represents lower quantity of money since the total amount of positions between 
1-3 billion dollars were higher than the sum of the positions above 3 billion dollars. 
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banking sector to transact in spot and derivatives market. By increasing the cost of 
those transactions, the aim was to shrink the liquidity of the market, which could be 
interpreted as an indirect message to potential foreign carry traders, intended to curb 
their speculative intentions. Beyond the above motivation, an additional objective of 
the Central Bank was to constraint the hazardous behavior of domestic banks. In 
particular, given the soaring liquidity in global markets, Brazilian banks attempted to 
take advantage of the different interest rates, via an enlargement on their foreign 
funding. In turn, those funds could be invested in highly-yielding Brazilian assets. 
     With regard to the stability of the whole financial system, authorities tried to 
moisten the magnitude of the specific approach. The main concern was to prevent the 
negative event of sudden outflows or a potential distress to the exchange rate, since 
once again such approach could leave banks defenseless to currency mismatch and 
excessively reliant on foreign funds
26
. In conclusion, the combination of firstly, the 
significant increase in IOF tax and secondly the implementation of reserve 
requirements on short foreign currency position, worked adequately to intercept 
potential speculative attacks on the Brazilian currency. 
     Given that the majority of advanced economies preferred to obtain a relative 
pathetic pose against the use of Map instruments, the Central Bank of Brazil did not 
rely on the efficacy of the broad toolkit mentioned above, to secure the domestic 
economy. Conversely, in the middle of 2011 additional set of measures came into 
practice. Specifically, IOF taxation has been also implemented on external credit 
inflows aiming to alleviate long-term flows and to minimize speculative short-term 
inflows. The IOF levy has been placed to 6% on domestically issued debt securities or 
inflows associated with external borrowing and maturity below one year. Regardless 
the application of the particular IOF tax, capital inflows surged compared with the 
level of 2010, by 14.6% (see also, Figure8- Capital inflows in Brazil). Local 
authorities expanded the tax to loans with maturity below 2, 3 and 5 years 
consecutively within a month (October 2011). Roure et. al. (2013) argue that, the 
efficiency of those modifications is doubtful, given that Brazil eventually taxed loans 
with maturity below one year
27
. Considering the amplified international liquidity in 
2011, the growth in capital inflows can be primarily attributed on the attractiveness of 
the Brazilian assets as a secure and safe destination for global investor funds.  
     Bearing in mind the existence of a significant trade-off between imposing 
consequent taxations on foreign exchange markets and latent spillovers to the real 
economy, the Central Bank of Brazil persisted on imposing a supplementary IOF tax 
on FX derivatives. The rate of the specific tax was set at 1%, regardless any kind of 
transactions of financial derivatives (acquire or sale), or residence positions (residents 
or nonresidents), with the capability to be calibrated up to 25% maximum. Those Map 
measures were initially designed to hamper the immoderate and intense short 
positions and secondly to prevent speculative attacks on the exchange rate
28
. Figure 
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 In line with Silva and Harris (2012), as stated by the Brazilian regulations on the foreign exchange 
market: banks open a short cash position when they sell foreign currency borrowed abroad. Similarly, 
when a bank contracts a direct loan or issues securities, it opens a long position. 
27
 The authors (Roure et al. 2013) argue that the specific policy had no impact on the real economy, 
since commercial behaviour remained stable. 
28
 According to Fritz and Prates (2014), during periods of low risk aversion both before and after the 
global financial crisis, foreign institutional investors, primarily hedge funds, have been the most 
important investor group in the Brazilian FX future market, fostering the appreciation of the domestic 
currency through carry trade. 
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12 illustrates that following the IOF tax announcement on July of 2011, FX 
derivatives exposure and exchange rate sharply returned to standard levels. 
 
Figure 12: Foreign currency derivatives exposure and exchange rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Siva and Harris (2012) 
 
     In summary, judging from the analysis of varied tools implemented to every 
possible weakness of the domestic economy, macroprudential policy in Brazil could 
be characterized as relative intensive and properly organized. According solely to the 
Figures and statistics presented in this section of the paper, the majority of the tools 
implemented by the Brazilian policymakers during the crisis have been roughly 
efficient to accomplish the overall goal of diminishing financial exposure. The 
following section, empirically analyzes the effectiveness of those instruments in terms 
of vulnerability of capital flows. Finally, Table 6 in the next page historically reviews 
the exact dates of implementation and shortly describes all the measures analyzed in 
the particular section. 
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Table 6: Macroprudential instrument in Brazil (Specific dates) 
 
 
 
VI. Data and Model specification. 
 
     As mentioned already, since the paper reproduces the empirical formation from an 
existing paper, the data review and empirical specification that follows are in 
accordance with Bruno and Shin (2013). 
 
A. Data description: 
 
     Aiming to analyze the effectiveness of Brazil’s Map measures in comparison with 
a variety of countries, the sample consists of 46 economical significant countries
29
. 
Meaning that all the selected economies have been chosen in such a way that each 
country’s financial system can be considerable subjective by bank counterparties 
                                                          
29
 In contrast with Claessens et. al.(2008) database ,Egypt and Vietnam have been excluded from the 
sample due to data unavailability on local factors (RER/GDP/Debt to GDP). 
Instrument Date Description 
IOF Tax 20/October/2009 2% Tax on non-resident equity and fix income portfolio 
inflows. 
IOF Tax on FX 1/October/2010 Increase in IOF on margin requirements for FX derivatives 
transactions from 0.38 to 6%. 
IOF Tax 5/October/2010 4% Tax on fixed-income portfolio investment and equity 
funds. 
IOF Tax 18/October/2010 6% Tax on fixed-income investments. 
Reserve 
Requirements 
6/January/2011 Unremunerated reserve requirements of 60% on bank’s 
gross FX position beyond 3 billion US$.  
IOF Tax 29/March/2011 6% Tax on new foreign loans with maturity below one 
year. 
IOF Tax 7/April/2011 Extension of 6% Tax on new foreign loans with maturity 
below two years. 
Reserve 
Requirements 
8/June/2011 Unremunerated reserve requirements of 60% on bank’s 
gross FX position beyond 1 billion US$.  
Tax on currency 
derivatives 
27/June/2011 Implementation of a 1% financial tax on all agents’ 
excessively long positions on Brazilian Real. 
IOF Tax 1/December/2011 Reduction of IOF on equity and fix-income portfolio 
inflows to 0%. 
IOF Tax 1/March/2012 Extension of 6% Tax on new foreign loans with maturity 
below 3 years. 
IOF Tax 9/March/2012 Extension of 6% Tax on new foreign loans with maturity 
below 5 years. 
IOF Tax 13/June/2012 Decrease of 6% Tax on new foreign loans with maturity 
below 2 years. 
IOF Tax 4/1December/2012 Decrease of 6% Tax on new foreign loans with maturity 
below 1 year. 
Tax on currency 
derivatives 
18/December/2012 Unremunerated reserve requirements of 60% on bank’s 
gross FX position beyond 3 billion US$. 
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abroad. In particular, all advanced economies have been included (28), the five big 
ASEAN countries (5), and a variety of emerging and developing countries (13). The 
range of the last group of countries that have been included is in accordance with a 
database of foreign banks (see, Claessens et. al. 2008). Besides, in order to avoid 
biased results, world-wide off-shore financial centers (such as, Luxemburg, 
Liechtenstein and Singapore) have been dropped from the sample. 
     The complete catalog of countries’ sample is the following: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and 
Uruguay. 
 
Table 7: Summary Statistics: The variables in terms of theirs mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Next, after the description of the sampled countries follows an explicit report of 
the main explanatory and control variables that have been incorporated. First of all, as 
provided by the BIS locational statistics
30
 ,the key determinant of capital flows (BIS 
loans growth) employed, is calculated based on the quarterly log difference in 
external claims of BIS- reporting country banks. Furthermore, as already explained in 
previous section, the two major independent variables are (i) the growth in interoffice 
assets of foreign banks in the United States (ΔInteroffice)31  and (ii) the log value of 
VIX volatility index from Chicago Board Options Exchange Market (VIX)
32
. It is 
well-known that the VIX rate is an approximation for the leverage of global banks. 
Furthermore, the quarterly log difference of the VIX (ΔVIX) is also considered, as 
proxy for leverage variation and hence the pace at which lending rises based on the 
existing level of equity. 
     Apart from those main variables as potential indications of capital flows, a number 
of international and domestic controls have been implemented. Taken from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, the log value of real exchange rates 
(ΔRER)33 for all the 46 countries have been included. Next, the second control 
                                                          
30
 See Table 7A, in BIS locational statistics webpage. 
31
 Δ interoffice is taken from the Federal Reserve series H8 on commercial banks. Precisely, the series 
is given by the negative of the “net due to foreign-related offices”.  
32
The quarterly values have been computed as the average value of end-of day data taken from CBOE 
official webpage. 
33
 Real exchange rate is computed as the log of nominal exchange rate* (US CPI/local CPI), where CPI 
denotes consumer price index. 
33 
 
variable is the quarterly growth in the global money supply (Δmoney stock)34, from 
IFS database. Given that the available series in IFS were in local currency, they have 
been converted to US dollars by multiplying each one with the corresponding 
exchange rate. Third, taken again from the International Financial Statistics database, 
gross domestic product growth (ΔGDP) is the country percentage change in GDP 
from the previous quarter
35
. Finally, from World Economic Outlook database, the last 
control variable is the annual growth in government gross debt to GDP (ΔDebt to 
GDP) due to lack of quarterly data for all the included countries. Regarding the 
sample period, the analysis begins on the first quarter of 1996
36
 until the last quart of 
2013 .As a final point, it should be noted that in line with Bruno and Shin (2013)  and 
aiming to alleviate endogeneity issues, all quarter variables are lagged by one quarter 
(apart from ΔVIX). 
 
B. Empirical Specification: 
 
      As already mentioned, the empirical research and specification that follows is 
based on a benchmark panel regression conducted by Bruno and Shin (2013):  
Equation (1) 
 
     ΔLc,t= α + β1 ΔInterofficet-1 + γ1 VIXt-1 + δ1 ΔVIXt + ΔRER t-1 +  
 +Δmoney stock t-1 + ΔGDP t-1 + Δ Debt to GDP t + ec,t 
 
 
The above form of panel regression, equation (1), corresponds to the first column of 
Table 9, where the dependent variable ΔLc,t, , is banking sector capital inflow into 
country c in period t, as given by the quarterly log difference in the external claims of 
BIS-reporting country banks on country c between quarters t and t-1; VIXt-1 is the log 
of end-quarter VIX index lagged by one quarter and ΔVIX the quarterly log 
difference of VIX; ΔInterofficet-1 is the growth in interoffice assets of foreign banks in 
the United States from the quarter before given the percentage growth and lagged by 
one quarter (Bruno and Shin, 2013). On the subject of the control factors, indications 
and explanation have been explicitly analyzed in the previous paragraph.  
         Furthermore, country fixed effects have been implemented on panel regressions 
and a set of year dummies as well. Precisely, the specification includes, a dummy 
variable (“Post 2010”) equal to 1 (0 otherwise) for the period from the third quarter of 
2010 until the end of 2012
37
 and a dummy variable (“Brazil”) equal to 1 (0 elsewhere) 
aiming to capture the specific effect on Brazil. Subsequently, the two dummies have 
been interacted firstly with the key independent variables (Δ Interoffice/ VIX and 
ΔVIX) and secondly with the controls. The main concern of the empirical part is to 
identify the impact of the triple interaction terms specified by:  
  
Global factor* Brazil * Post 2010, 
                                                          
34
Δmoney stock transformed in US dollars and is computed as: the quarterly log difference of the sum 
of M2 stock in the United States, Eurozone, and Japan, and M4 in the United Kingdom.  
35
 Quarterly data have been applied, in contrast with Bruno and Shin (2013) who applied annual data 
of the specific control variable. 
36
 Based on the availability of BIS locational data, (Table 7A), which starts from the first quarter of 
1996. 
37
 The specific period from October 2010 until December 2012 is chosen according to the 
implementation of various macroprudential measures presented on Table 6. 
34 
 
 
which indicates the sensitiveness of capital flows to Brazil according to each factor 
after October 2010. Consequently, the coefficients of the two double interaction terms 
have also been examined:  
 
Global factor*Brazil  and Global factor* Post 2010,  
 
given that the comparison between the triple interactions terms and the double 
interaction terms, are adequate indicators to identify if the alternation in sensitivity of 
the triple interaction term is attributable to the specific country policies or a broad 
shift over time (Bruno and Shin 2013). 
     Precisely, global factor stands for ΔInteroffice, VIX and ΔVIX in the context of 
examining how a country is particular sensitive to global conditions. Thus the 
augmented panel regressions with country interaction terms, aim to capture the impact 
of global factors on the Brazilian economy. The following specifications (2) and (3) 
represent the augmented panel regressions regarding the interaction between 
ΔInteroffice and the (i) whole sample, (ii) Brazil and (iii) Brazil after the introduction 
of Map policy. 
Equation (2): 
 
ΔLc,t= α + β1 ΔInterofficet-1 + β3 ΔInteroffice t-1*Brazil + 
+ γ1 VIXt-1 + δ1 ΔVIXt + controls + ec,t 
 
Equation (3): 
 
ΔLc,t= α + β1 ΔInterofficet-1 + β2 ΔInteroffice t-1*Post2010 + 
+ β3 ΔInteroffice t-1*Brazil + β4 ΔInteroffice t-1*Post2010*Brazil + 
+ γ1 VIXt-1 + δ1 ΔVIXt + controls + ec,t 
 
     Coefficient β1 in (2) is designed to capture the impact of ΔInteroffice on capital 
flows for the full sample of countries. Whereas, coefficient β3 on the Interaction term 
(ΔInteroffice t-1* Brazil) is designed to indicate the additional impact of ΔInteroffice 
variable specifically on the case of Brazil. Next, regarding the augmented 
specification that corresponds to equation (3), coefficient β2 measures the impact of 
ΔInteroffice on capital flows after the introduction of the measures and β4 gives 
Brazilian sensitivity to ΔInteroffice regarding the specific period of interest (3rd 
quarter of 2010 until the end of 2012). The idea is to identify potential shift in the 
sensitivity of capital flows prior and after the implementation of the measures. Thus, a 
potential shift in the sign (from positive before to negative after October 2010) might 
be an indication of capital inflows constraint which consequently reflects efficacy of 
Macroprudential policy in terms of banking capital flows. Besides, one of the main 
concerns of the specific paper is the exact impact of ΔInteroffice on the Brazilian 
economy prior and ahead of Q3-2010 and is captured by the coefficients β3 and 
β3+β4, respectively. Next, for the case of ΔInteroffice, Table 8 below depicts the 
interactions structure which gives the total effects between Brazil and the rest 
countries of the sample before and after October 2010.  
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Table8: Coefficients interactions. 
  
 
 
 
 
The initial concept of the particular Table is to highlight the distinction between each 
global factor prior and after 2010 for Brazil and secondly how differently was the 
impact on the rest of the sample in comparison with Brazil according to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
1. The null hypothesis (β2+β4=0), represents the statement that: there has been no 
change in the sensitivity of Brazil to ΔInteroffice before and after 2010. 
2. The null hypothesis (β3+β4=0), represents the statement that: there is no difference 
in Brazil and the rest of the sample to ΔInteroffice after 2010. 
3. The null hypothesis (β1+β2=0), represents the statement that: there has been no 
change in the sensitivity of the whole sample to ΔInteroffice before and after 2010. 
4.The null hypothesis (β1+β2+β3+β4), represents the statement that: global bank 
activities no longer influence capital flows to Brazil. 
  
Analogously, the set of interaction series related to the additional two global factors is 
presented by (γ) coefficients for the second independent variable (VIX) and by (δ) 
coefficients for ΔVIX (see Table 9). The specific equations, not only for those two 
variables, but also for the control variables are presented in the Appendix since the 
analysis is identical to the preceded analysis of ΔInteroffice. The expected signs both 
for VIX and ΔVIX are negative since an increase in the specific index is linked to 
deleveraging process of the banking sector and hence capital flows through the 
particular sector. The specific pattern that table 8 illustrates holds for the rest of the 
variables (VIX and ΔVIX) and provides the overall effects as a consequence of the 
impact of each key variable with Brazil specifically. In that spirit, the set of null 
hypothesis that have been reported above considering solely the impact of 
ΔInteroffice are assumed to hold for coefficients γ and δ as well. 
 
  
VII. Empirical Findings. 
 
     Table 9 below depicts the initial set of panel regressions. In accordance with the 
previous section of empirical specification column 1, 2 and 3 corresponds to equation 
1, 2 and 3 respectively, while the exact specification for columns 4 and 5 are 
presented in the Appendix. First of all, R
2
 levels across the five columns are almost 
equal to the levels of R
2
 that Bruno and Shin (2013) report (11% on average). That is 
a first indication that the applied methodology is in accordance with their study. 
Moving to coefficients interpretation, the impact of ΔInteroffice before the 3rd quarter 
of 2010 on capital flows for all countries, apart from Brazil, is captured by the 
coefficient β1 in Table 9. At the same time, β2 depicts how the specific impact for the 
rest of the countries alerts after October 2010. 
     On the subject of global factors sensitivity, Column 1 provides the benchmark 
regression with highly significant and predicted sign coefficients, which is a second 
strong indication that the specific paper is in line with Bruno and Shin (2013). 
Specifically, β1 (ΔInteroffice coefficient) is positive while the coefficients γ1 and δ1 
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of VIX in levels and log difference are both negative and point out that the actions of 
international banks (mostly in Europe) are linked with the capital inflows into the 
selection of countries. Given the reasoning mentioned before, variations in the VIX 
and ΔVIX are related with changes in the leverage of global banks and so the capital 
movements throughout the banking sector. However, in contrast with the paper of 
Bruno and Shin (2013) all the control variables (apart from Δ Debt to GDP) are 
statistically insignificant. 
     The augmented estimation included the two dummy variables and their 
interactions with ΔInteroffice are reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 9. Aiming to 
identify the specific effect for Brazil using the interaction terms our analysis is 
focused on the coefficients β3 and β4. What is clear from the comparison between 
those two coefficients is that Brazil both before and after the introduction of the 
measures is not sensitive to global factors (instead of positive, coefficients are 
negative) However, the results considering those coefficients are statistically 
insignificant (see Table 9, column 3). A fact that prevents, the process of deriving 
conclusions on the topic of macroprudential policy effectiveness related to capital 
flows into Brazil. However, comparing with the rest of the sample, coefficient β2 in 
column 3 is statistical significant and positive, indicating that the effect of 
ΔInteroffice is stronger after the third quarter of 2010. Finally, even though the 
coefficients in the narrowed analysis are insignificant, it is observable that there is no 
swift in the coefficients before and after the implementation of the macroprudential 
measures (negative in both cases).     
     Once again, the regressions outcome presented in columns 4 and 5 included the 
interactions with VIX and ΔVIX and the (2010/Brazil) dummies are statistically 
insignificant. The negative coefficients (γ1 and δ1) indicate bigger sensitivity on 
capital flows since VIX index and leverage are reversely correlated. According to the 
regressions output (column 5) this statement holds for the whole sample but not 
specifically for the case of Brazil. Despite the statistical insignificance, in economic 
terms, the two positive signs (γ4 and δ4) in column 5 reflect larger inflows related to 
VIX and ΔVIX fluctuations.  
     Next, a number of F-tests (Wald-coefficient tests) have been conducted in the 
context of the overall impact across time and for different time period. Table 10 
below, presents the p-values on each null hypothesis according to the global factors 
reported in columns of Table 9. What is straightforward from Table 10 is that the null 
hypothesis (apart from the 3
rd
) reported in the previous section, are rejected even at 
10% level of significance. Meaning that, the specific analysis implemented on the 
case of Brazil, that the particular paper seeks to identify, is incapable to derive 
conclusions regarding the sensitivity of Brazil to global banking activities (i.e. swifts 
in ΔInteroffice fail to explain the dependent variable of the model). Concerning the 
fourth null hypothesis, (β1+β2+β3+β4) which corresponds to the statement that 
activities of global banks no longer influence the capital flows to Brazil, the reported 
p-value suggest that is not statistical significant. Identical hypothesis and the 
respectively tests for VIX and ΔVIX (γ and δ coefficients) have been conducted and 
are reported in Table 10. Each reported p-value corresponds to the respectively 
column specification of Table 9. Again changes in VIX index and the log difference 
in VIX cannot interpret the Brazilian inflows according to the specific model. Lastly, 
as Table 10 illustrates, the only p-values that are statistically significant correspond to 
null hypothesis regarding the whole sample (β1+β2), (γ1+γ2) and (δ1+δ2).  
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Table 9: Panel regressions. 
 
Note: The table presents panel regression for bank capital flows to 46 countries. The dependent 
variable is bank capital flows measured by the quarterly log difference of external loans. Explanatory 
variables include the growth in net interoffice assets, the VIX and the change in VIX and their 
interactions with two dummy variables as explained in the main text. Standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. The date spans from 1996Q1-2013Q3.  ***, ** and * denote statistical of significance at 
the 1,5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Coeff. Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
β1 Δ Interoffice 0.000613*** 0.000644*** -7.21E-06 0.000613*** 0.000216 
    [0.000204] [0.000207] [0.000270] [0.000205] [0.000211] 
β2 Δ Interoffice*Post 2010      0.001640***     
        [0.000439]     
β3 Δ Interoffice*Brazil   -0.001378 -0.001078     
      [0.001373] [0.001769]     
β4 Δ Interoffice*Post2010*Brazil        -0.000719     
        [0.002894]     
γ1 VIX -0.047347*** 0.001373*** -0.043429*** -0.047299*** -0.047455*** 
    [0.006062] [0.006062] [0.006140] [0.006119] [0.006067] 
γ2 VIX*Post2010         -0.012767*** 
            [0.001796] 
γ3 VIX*Brazil       -0.002135 -0.006044 
          [0.041896] [0.041725] 
γ4 VIX*Post2010*Brazil         0.024339 
            [0.013879] 
δ1 ΔVIX -0.040680*** -0.040674*** -0.037698*** -0.040948*** -0.044659*** 
    [0.008589] [0.008589] [0.008608] [0.008674] [0.009607] 
δ2 ΔVIX*Post2010         -0.002991 
            [0.020114] 
δ3 ΔVIX*Brazil       0.014298 0.012892 
          [0.063217] [0.070443] 
δ4 ΔVIX*Post2010*Brazil         
0.040473 
[0.142921] 
            
   ΔRER 0.075222 0.073327 0.069761 0.074816 0.073237 
    [0.054330] [0.054363] [0.054300] [0.054689] [0.054274] 
  Δ Money Stock 0.125713 0.125667 0.168621 0.125436 0.155539 
    [0.117142] [0.117142] [0.117454] [0.117201] [0.116539] 
  GDP growth 3.37E-05 3.37E-05 3.29E-05 3.37E-05 3.48E-05 
    [2.50E-05] [2.50E-05] [2.50E-05] [2.50E-05] [2.48E-05] 
  Δ Debt to GDP -0.078140*** -0.078126*** -0.080038*** -0.078183*** -0.074008*** 
    [0.010875] [0.010875] [0.010864] [0.010888] [0.010813] 
  Constant 0.164811*** 0.164879*** 0.153820*** 0.164772*** 0.170412*** 
    [0.018083] [0.018083] [0.018285] [0.018094] [0.017957] 
  Number of Observations 3312 3312 3312 3312 3312 
  R2 0.086816 0.087143 0.091671 0.086839 0.103625 
  Number of countries 46 46 46 46 46 
  Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y 
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In other words, there has been no change in the sensitivity of the sample countries to 
ΔInteroffice/VIX and ΔVIX prior and ahead of the third quarter 2010, which is line 
with the expected outcome
38
.   
 
Table 10: Wald tests for coefficient restrictions in Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Overall, the empirical part focusing on the global banking activities does not 
provide sufficient evidence for a shift in Brazil’s sensitivity to the factors of interest. 
In other words, the above analysis cannot statistically explain a potential decrease in 
the channeling of global banking funds into Brazil. That is, macroprudential measures 
related to capital flows introduced in Brazil after the third quarter of 2010 cannot be 
interpreted based on the key independent variables that Bruno and Shin employed in 
the case of South Korea. Consequently, the supplementary method
39
 of leverage 
measurement that has been accessed in the case of Brazil stands at low levels, 
potential due to the stricter accounting rules in comparison with global standards. The 
statistical insignificance of the outcome is not translated as “wrong”. In spite, it 
documents a positive aspect of Brazilian economy (since there is no correlation 
between the dependent and the key explanatory variables which are associated with 
leverage activities), while supports the view that global environment is highly affected 
by deleveraging runs. 
     Furthermore and beyond the examination of the possible linkage between global 
banking activities and their interaction with capital inflows in Brazil, my analysis 
investigates the fluctuations in sensitivity to supplementary factors (controls) as 
possible determinants of capital mobility. In contrast with Bruno and Shin, the set of 
regressions output presented in Table 11 (apart from ΔDebt to GDP) are statistically 
                                                          
38
 The specific date has been selected according to the Brazilian conditions and is not associated with 
global scale occasions. 
39
 The traditional method of leverage measurement is given by the ratio between total assets over 
equity.  
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insignificant (see, in Table 11 coefficient 1 at columns 1/2/3 and 4). Interestingly, 
when the same control variables are implemented without being lagged by one quarter 
they turn to be highly significant and with the predicted signs (as holds for ΔDebt to 
GDP). 
     Although, when the specific variables are lagged the outcome turns to be 
statistically insignificant. Normally, ΔRER was expected to capture the shifts in the 
dependent variable since potential appreciation of the Real against the dollar from 
quarter t to quarter t+1, induces increase in the level of capital flows into the country 
from quarter t+1 to quarter t+2. The specific aspect is generally true under the 
framework of local banks borrowers facing a currency mismatch which in turn 
increases the capacity of local banks to lend (for a thorough analysis see Shin 2012). 
The particular mechanism is the reasoning behind the amplified capital inflows but is 
not confirmed by the empirical findings that column 1 of Table 11 reports. 
     The next two control variables that are applied in the model, but again do not 
correspond to statistically significant results are firstly the quarterly growth in global 
money stock and secondly the growth in countries’ GDP. Table 11 in the next page 
presents the analysis related to capital flows with respect to RER, an approximation of 
global money stock, GDP growth and finally the growth in Debt to GDP following 
exactly the same structure as in Table 9 before. Analogously, one triple and two 
double interaction terms have been generated using the same dummy variables that 
have been analyzed earlier for each local factor (see model specification in 
Appendix). Once more, only the coefficients that correspond to the whole sample of 
countries turn to be significant, leaving no option of interpretation and further 
discussion in the case of Brazil solely.  
     In addition, Table 12 provides the corresponding
40
 p-values of similar F-tests with 
respect to each of the four control variables. For instance, (3) + (4) null hypothesis 
represents the existence of difference between Brazil and the rest of the countries after 
October 2010.  
 
Table 12: Wald test for coefficient restrictions in Table 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The specific null is not rejected for all the control variables, suggesting the linkage 
between capital flows and those controls is different for Brazil relative to the rest 45 
countries. Taking everything under consideration, the above empirical study included 
dummy interactions, firstly with key and secondly with control variables, 
accompanied by a complete set of F-tests do not succeed to specify whether Brazil’s 
macroprudential measures manage to curb capital flows related to the banking sector.  
                                                          
40
 Where columns (1),(2),(3) and (4) correspond to the coefficients listed in Table 10 for each of the 
four variables ΔRER, Δ Money Stock, GDP growth and ΔDebt to GDP growth. 
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Table 11: Panel regressions with interaction dummies for local variables. 
 
Note: The table depicts a summary of panel regressions for bank capital flows to 46 countries. The 
dependent variable is bank capital flows measured by the quarterly log difference of external loans. 
Explanatory variables include the local “demand pull” factors, money stock growth and interactions 
with two dummy variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The date spans from 1996Q1-
2013Q3.***,** and * denote statistical significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Coeff. 1 2 3 4 
 Δ Interoffice 0.000602*** 0.000120 0.000622*** 0.000567*** 
   [0.000205] [0.000219] [0.000205] [0.000205] 
 VIX -0.047184*** -0.046570*** -0.047574*** -0.048765*** 
   [0.006070] [0.006027] [0.006060] [0.006080] 
 ΔVIX -0.041241*** -0.041076*** -0.040608*** -0.042570*** 
   [0.008628] [0.008544] [0.008593] [0.008597] 
1 ΔRER 0.061304 0.075001 0.077108 0.080075 
   [0.058621] [0.054474] [0.054350] [0.054432] 
2 ΔRER* Post 2010 0.158420 
 
    
   [0.236253] 
 
    
3 ΔRER* Brazil 0.048164 
 
    
   [0.194923] 
 
    
4 ΔRER*Post 2010*Brazil 0.397168 
 
    
   [1315064]       
1 Δ Money stock 0.123781 0.256435 0.125964 0.131987 
   [0.117303] [0.118799] [0.117103] [0.117024] 
2 Δ Money stock* Post 2010   -1.829.645***     
     [0.299063]     
3 Δ Money stock*Brazil   -0.310237     
     [1.174982]     
4 Δ Money stock*Post 2010*Brazil   0.755145     
     [1.276155]     
1 GDP growth 3.37E-05 3.47E-05 6.26E-05** 3.50E-05 
   [2.50E-05] [2.49E-05] [2.78E-05] [2.50E-05] 
2 GDP growth* Post 2010   
 
-0.000150**   
     
 
[6.36E-05]   
3 GDP growth* Brazil   
 
0.000827   
     
 
[0.004865]   
4 GDP growth * Post 2010 * Brazil   
 
-0.124789   
       [0.156766]   
1 Δ Debt to GDP -0.078801*** -0.075935*** -0.077991*** -0.068994*** 
   [0.010923] [0.010820] [0.010869] [0.011177] 
2 Δ Debt to GDP* Post 2010   
 
  -0.150944*** 
     
 
  [0.043846] 
3 Δ Debt to GDP* Brazil   
 
  -0.096141 
     
 
  [0.275016] 
4 Δ Debt to GDP* Post 2010* Brazil   
 
  -0.194866 
     
 
  [1.644753] 
 Constant 0.164375*** 0.164815*** 0.165427*** 0.169828*** 
   [0.018105] [0.017975] [0.018075] [0.018152] 
 Number of observations 3312 3312 3312 3312 
 R2 0.087043 0.098904 0.088831 0.090708 
 Number of countries 46 46 46 46 
 Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
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The next section seeks to identify potential reasons explaining why the particular 
approximation did not managed to provide statistically significant results and 
discusses further the overall case of Brazil. 
 
VIII. Further Discussion on the case of Brazil. 
 
A. Indications related to empirical findings: 
 
     Even though the Brazilian economy has been exposed to global banking 
interaction channels as this has been explained in detail in the earlier sections of the 
paper, the exact size of Brazil’s interconnectedness, in comparison with other 
countries, could be a strong indication why the empirical analysis did not explain 
Brazilian banking capital flows. In particular a study by IMF argues that cross-border 
financial interconnectedness and the associated risk are limited by the moderate share 
of foreign banks in the financial system and low foreign exposures (IMF, 2013)
41
. 
Therefore, in accordance with BIS statistical report on banks, the dependent variable 
that has been employed, “cross-border claims of Brazilian banks”, reflects no more 
than the 5% of GDP. As the right panel in figure 13 illustrates, the Brazilian cross-
border banking exposure (on other countries) in September 2011 was lower than 4% 
in comparison with the European-periphery countries. Moreover, cross-border claims 
correspond to 8.6% of Brazilian banks’ overall lending.  
 
Figure 13: Cross-border banking exposure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF country’s report (2013). 
 
     Given that the key explanatory variables were closely related to leverage actions 
and in accordance with the above rationale, it seems relatively normal why they fail to 
explain the dependent variable of the model. Overall, the Brazilian economy could be 
characterized as self-secured during the specific dates, since the financial system is 
mainly funded by domestic deposits and repos. Thus, in comparison with other 
                                                          
41
 Brazil: A Technical Note on Macroprudential Policy Framework. IMF Staff Country Reports Number 
13/148. 
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countries, financial institutions’ exposure to cross-border capital flows and foreign 
currency liabilities (9%) was fairly low (see, left panel of figure 13). The combination 
of (i) small share of foreign banks presence, (ii) relatively low dependence on external 
funds and (iii) limited foreign exposures reveals a financial system that is not 
correlated with the global factors that has been examined in the previous stage.  
     Next, on the subject of capital flows, it is worth to mention and compare for a 
second time, Figure 8 which was presented in section IV. The reason is to investigate 
and pay special attention on the composition of capital flows and their variation after 
2010. Figure 14 below, reveals the difference between the two countries related to the 
third bar (grey color) which represents banking flows. In the top graph (Korea), it can 
be observed that the specific variable shifts negatively at the beginning of 2011 as a 
consequence of Koreas’ Map policy. Whereas, in the bottom graph the same bar (grey 
color) for the case of Brazil remains relatively stable and unaffected throughout the 
specific period even though the total capital flows sharply decrease. That is a second 
strong indication that could merely enlighten the empirical findings in the previous 
section. 
 
Figure 14: Capital Flows in South Korea and Brazil (in million US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Fritz and Prates (2014), modified by the author. 
 
     Finally, since the initial comparison and replication of the paper was conducted 
aligned with the case of South Korea, Figure 15 below plots the dependent variable 
which has been applied to both countries. The specific assessment aims to identify the 
existence of a common trend or not, related to the same proxy for capital flows. The 
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two series are normalized to 100 in the first quarter of 2003. In line with section III of 
the paper, what is clear for both countries is the harmonized increase in cross-borders 
lending before 2008 and the sudden drop afterwards. While, what is mostly apparent 
from the comparison of the two series is the change of directions that took place 
exactly in the period of interest. In one case, macroprudential tools introduced by the 
Korean authorities in June 2010 seem to affect (reduce) the foreign claims of Korea 
(this capital inflows), while in the second case Brazilian claims remain unchanged and 
continue to rise in a steady pose. Effectively, relating to the case of Brazil this could 
be an additional suggestion regarding the implications of the empirical part when the 
interactions were included. Since all the potential aspects and features related to the 
empirical investigation have been reported, the following subsection presents a couple 
of suggestions (Map measures) that could be applied in the Brazilian economy. 
 
Figure 15: BIS Bank capital flows in Brazil and South Korea. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIS (Table 7A) – Locational Banking Statistics. 
 
B: Towards a continuous macroprudential framework: 
 
     In line with the existing literature
42
 broadly related to macroprudential measures 
and in accordance with the case of Brazil, the following sub-section points out 
potential macroprudential instruments and summarizes the next steps of Map policy in 
Brazil. Before analyzing those measures, it should be noted that the existing tools 
which have been analyzed in the particular paper, have been modified across time 
analogously to the occasion that required. Therefore, alerting our attention apart from 
the framework of capital flows and returning back to the analysis of the whole 
domestic economy, Brazil has overly reduced the impact of various macroprudential 
measures. For example, along with government measures to stimulate the domestic 
economy, by the end of 2011, the Central bank of Brazil allowed the expansion of 
consumer loans (reported in Table 5). The Risk Weight Factor has been reduced from 
150% back to the earlier value of 75%, employed on capital requirement calculation 
on all collateralized car loans with maturities below sixty months, regardless of loan 
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to value ratio (Silva and Harris, 2012). Next, by the same period, the Tax on Financial 
Transactions (IOF) for individual loans has also been reduced from 0.0082% 
previously to the initial rate of 0.0068% and later (May-2012) even lower at 0.0041% 
per day. 
     Aside from those adjustments, there is always space in Map toolkit for 
developments related to systemic risk monitoring. Firstly, replicating existing and 
fairly efficient measures from other countries experience, limits on loan to values 
(LTV) and debt to income ratios (DTI) might enhance the framework against systemic 
risk expansion
43
. The specific set of Macroprudential measures, should be targeted 
against the mortgage loans expansion and appreciation of housing prices that took 
place after 2010. Furthermore, the combination of LTV and DTI is complementary 
since those instruments address both the wealth and income aspect, respectively. 
However, a hypothetical implementation of those tools, lurks high observance cost 
(collection of transactions based data) and complex calibration. Secondly, in 
accordance with Basel III directions, the introduction of countercyclical capital 
buffers may function as an absorb factor of future financial imbalances. The usage of 
credit to GDP gap is suggested by the Basel Community on Banking Supervision as a 
conditional variable that governs the required level of capital buffers. In fact, this 
measure may work as a cushion since it automatically stabilizes financial exposures 
and imbalances. 
     Finally, approaching the concluding section of this study, the current and future 
steps of Brazilian economy related to macroprudential issues are summarized in the 
following lines. Objectives such as, stabilization of capital flows, restrain of credit 
booms, prevention of asset price bubbles and management of foreign exchange 
volatility, constantly continue to alarm the prudence of local authorities. Calibration, 
on a precautionary basis, of the existing Map toolkit is on top priority actions in 
policymakers’ agenda. Deeper understanding of the interactions between the financial 
system and the real economy could be accomplished throughout the development of 
targeted macroprudential tools. In parallel, the prevention of distortions and the 
subsequent side-effects could maintain the sound and secure domestic economy.  
     Given the magnitude of the crisis, as has explicitly analyzed in earlier sections of 
the paper, Brazil’s reaction in terms of macroprudential policy proved more than 
adequate. Complacency is not an option, since additional challenges on the subject of 
interconnectedness between the real economy and the financial system are 
debouching constantly. In the future, under a consistent macroprudential outlook, the 
foremost tasks are primarily to enlarge the supervisory scale (including non-banking 
financial institutions) and to enhance stress tests on vulnerable banks. Besides, closer 
communication between different domestic
44
 and international supervisory agencies 
should be geared towards clarity, transparency and predictability, in order to enhance 
the effectiveness of macroprudential policy (Born et.al 2012). In that spirit, the 
Central Bank should continue to execute its macroprudential supervisory role 
ensuring currency stability and overall soundness of domestic economy.  
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IX. Conclusions. 
     What the recent financial crisis has made clear, is that as the global financial 
system evolves in a more sophisticate and complex direction, the necessity for 
additional regulation is mandatory. The existing microprudential structure proved 
inadequate to handle the magnitude of the crisis. Macroprudential policy is the new 
approach, that the global community has directed its attention, intending to fill the gap 
of an overall prudential framework targeted on the financial system as a whole. In this 
paper, I have explicitly reported all the recent developments in terms of 
macroprudential policy. In parallel, a detailed analysis on the driving forces governing 
the global banking system has been preformed and it has been carefully linked with 
the empirical investigation that followed. Based on an existing methodology that have 
been applied in the case of Korea by Bruno and Shin (2013), the initial aim of the 
paper was to investigate the Brazilian macroprudential framework in terms of capital 
flows. The transmission of global liquidity towards the domestic economy, and the 
constraint of the associated capital inflows was the main concern of the Brazilian 
authorities. 
     In that context, aiming to identify the performance of Brazil’s macroprudential 
instruments, a panel study has been conducted, where Brazil is the country of interest 
among a sample of 46 countries. Even though, my analysis managed to replicate the 
exact methodology by Bruno and Shin (2013), the empirical outcome turns to be 
statistical insignificant for the case of Brazil. Precisely, the coefficients of the 
interaction terms which have been designed to capture potential shift in Brazilian 
capital inflows were statistically insignificant. Consequently, the explanatory 
variables that succeeded to explain the decrease in Koreas’ capital inflows after the 
introduction of the measures are not associated with banking capital flows of Brazil.    
     Potential reasons, explaining the specific outcome could be the combination of (i) 
small share of foreign banks presence, (ii) relatively low dependence on external 
funds and (iii) limited foreign exposures. Besides, the composition of capital flows 
between the two countries seemed to have affected the output of the empirical 
investigation. Eventually and in accordance with the major question that my study 
meant to answer, the empirical outcome suggests that in comparison with the rest of 
the countries in the sample, Brazilian vulnerability to global banking factors is 
statistical insignificant both prior and after the introduction of the measures. However, 
considering the whole sample, empirical findings indicate that global banking factors 
affected the volatility of capital inflows. In line with Bruno and Shin (2013), the 
specific evidence supports the view that banking sector capital flows determine 
fluctuations in the global financial system. 
     Summarizing, most empirical studies on the topic of Map policy found that when 
an instrument or a combination of instruments was implemented according to the 
required situation, it managed to reduce systemic risk quite effectively. At the end of 
2010, under a relatively strong regulation and supervision of the financial system, 
Brazilian authorities relied on a broad textbook framework to cope with the rising 
risks of macroeconomic and financial disorder. In that context, beyond the purely 
empirical investigation, my study analyzed under a theoretical perspective the broad 
effectiveness of Macroprudential policy, implemented in various frictions of the 
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domestic economy. Thus, given that macroprudential policy seeks to restrain systemic 
risk, the paper identifies and documents potential indicators of systemic risk 
concluding that, Brazilian authorities managed to overcome the severe turmoil of the 
global financial crisis in a quite sufficient way. 
      Further research on the subject of macroprudential policy, questioning the 
effectiveness of its implementation in other advanced, emerging or developing 
countries, needs to be conducted. In particular, special interest presents the assessment 
of Map policy in emerging countries such as China, Russia or Turkey. In that spirit, 
the particular study on the case of Brazil might be a useful contribution on future 
investigations concerning the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. Finally, the 
current context of the global economy has triggered a new thinking among regulators 
and policymakers not in terms of what actions should be taken after the next episodes 
of financial distress, but mainly what actions should be taken in advance in order to 
prevent these and the accompanied negative impact on the side of the real economy. 
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Table 2A: Distinction between macroprudential and microprudential policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BIS Working Paper No 128. 
 
 
 
Figure 1A: Assets and liabilities of the branches and subsidiaries of foreign 
banks in the US on their parent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bruno and Shin (2013) 
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Table 3A 
Brazilian Macroeconomic Indicators. 
Source: Central Bank of Brazil, Mendes (2011) 
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Model Specification: 
Equations (4) and (5) below correspond to columns 4 and 5 of Table 9, while 
equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) correspond to columns 1,2,3 and 4 of Table 11, 
respectively. 
 
 
Equation (4) 
ΔLc,t= α +β1 ΔInteroffice t-1+ γ1 VIXt-1+ γ3 VIXt-1*Brazil +  
+ δ1 ΔVIXt + δ3 ΔVIXt-1*Brazil + controls + ec,t 
 
Equation (5) 
ΔLc,t= α +β1 ΔInteroffice t-1+ γ1 VIXt-1+ γ2 VIXt-1 *Post2010 + 
+ γ3 VIXt-1*Brazil + γ4 VIXt-1*Post2010*Brazil + 
+ δ1 ΔVIXt + δ2 ΔVIXt *ΔPost2010 + 
+ δ3 ΔVIXt*Brazil + δ4 ΔVIXt*Post2010*Brazil + controls + ec,t 
 
Equation (6) 
ΔLc,t= α + β1 ΔInterofficet-1 + γ1 VIXt-1 + δ1 ΔVIXt + RER t-1 + 
+ RER t-1 * Post2010+ RER t-1 *Brazil + RER t-1 *Post2010*Brazil + 
controls+ ec,t 
 
Equation (7) 
ΔLc,t= α + β1 ΔInterofficet-1 + γ1 VIXt-1 + δ1 ΔVIXt + RER t-1  + 
+ Money stockt-1 + Money stockt-1 * Post2010 +  
Money stockt-1 *Brazil + Money stockt-1*Post2010*Brazil + 
+ controls+ ec,t 
 
Equation (8) 
ΔLc,t= α + β1 ΔInterofficet-1 + γ1 VIXt-1 + δ1 ΔVIXt + RER t-1  
+ Money stockt-1+ GDP t-1+ GDP t-1 * Post2010+ 
 +GDP t-1 *Brazil + GDP t-1  t-1 *Post2010*Brazil + controls+ ec,t 
 
Equation (9) 
ΔLc,t= α + β1 ΔInterofficet-1 + γ1 VIXt-1 + δ1 ΔVIXt + RER t-1  
+ Money stockt-1+ GDP t-1+ Debt to GDPt + 
 +Debt to GDPt * Post2010+ + Debt to GDPt *Brazil +  
+Debt to GDPt *Post2010*Brazil + ec,t 
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Figure 2A: Global money stock from 2007 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF’s IFS database 
 
Figure 3A: External claims (loans and deposits) of BIS reporting countries on 
borrowers in a selection of the “Big” European countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The series have been normalized to 100, on the first quarter of 2003 
Source: BIS (Table 7A) – Locational Banking Statistics. 
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Figure 4A: External claims (loans and deposits) of BIS reporting countries on 
borrowers in a selection of the “Small” European countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The series have been normalized to 100, on the first quarter of 2003 
Source: BIS (Table 7A) – Locational Banking Statistics 
Table 4A: Supervisory Institutional Architecture in Brazil. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IMF country’s report (2013) 
 
 
 
 
